We propose an efficient automatic checking algorithm, Athena, for analyzing security protocols. Athena 
Introduction
A security protocol is a communication protocol that uses cryptography to achieve goals such as authentication and key distribution. Because of the subtlety of security protocols, experience has shown that the protocols can be flawed even when designed carefully. Thus, it is necessary to develop rigorous ways to analyze these protocols.
Many researchers have worked on applying formal techniques to the analysis of security protocols. They have developed logics of knowledge and belief such as BAN logic [2] and GNY logic [7] ; semi-automatic and fully automatic tools such as the NRL Analyzer [14] , the Interrogator Model [16] , FDR [12] , Mur' [17] , Brutus [5] , and Revere [9] ; and theorem provers such as Isabelle [19] . Automatic checkers have the practical advantage that they are easy to use and do not need the assistance of experienced users. Unfortunately, current automatic checkers suffer from the state space explosion problem, mainly due to asynchronous composition and symmetry redundancy. Most automatic checkers are also limited to checking the properties of a security protocol under certain configurations of the protocol execution, e.g. with two initiators and two responders.
Thayer, Herzog and Guttman recently proposed the Strand Space Model (SSM) and demonstrated how to use SSM to prove certain security properties manually, for example authentication and secrecy [25] . SSM has the advantage that it contains the exact causal relation information which makes proofs concise. Inspired by their work, we have developed a new algorithm, Athena, for analyzing security protocols automatically.
We have designed a logic based on SSM that can express formally various security properties including authentication, secrecy and properties related to electronic commerce. We have also developed an automatic procedure for evaluating well-formed formulae in this logic. We provide a way of formally reduce the infinite-state-space problem into a finite-state-space problem which can be verified using model checking. Hence, for a well-formed formula, if the evaluation procedure terminates, then it will generate a counterexample if the formula is false, or provide a proof if the formula is true. Although the evaluation procedure is not guaranteed to terminate, experience shows that it does terminate for many useful protocols. In those cases when the procedure does not terminate for arbitrary configurations of the protocol execution, termination can always be forced by bounding the number of concurrent protocol runs and the length of messages. This is similar to the bounds in current model checkers such as FDR, Mur' and Brutus.
Athena also exploits several state space reduction techniques. First, the state transition is not asynchronously composed of independent process transitions, hence, avoid the state space explosion caused by asynchronous composition. Second, the state structures and state transitions capture exact causal relations, hence, achieve compact and efficient state representations. Third, Athena takes advantage of symbolic state transitions instead of explicit state search, by allowing a state to contain free variables. A state sx with free term variables,x, represents a class of variablefree states, f ~ =x sxg, where~ is a substitution of term values. A state transition between two states which contain free variables represents a set of state transitions between two variable-free states. Thus, Athena can represent states and state transitions much more efficiently. As a special case of this, it naturally avoids the symmetry redundancy problem. Finally, Athena uses backward search instead of forward search. With forward search, all the participating principals have to be pre-stated. Our approach starts with a simple initial strand and then add new strands only when necessary according to exact causal relations. As demonstrated in our experiments, these techniques greatly reduce the state space that needs to be explored comparing with other current approaches.
Athena also has the advantage that it can easily incorporate results from theorem proving through unreachability theorems. By using the unreachability theorems, we can prune the state space at an early stage, hence, reduce the state space explored even further and increase the likelyhood of termination.
The paper is organized as follows. We first review some basic notions and properties of strand spaces (section 2). We then introduce a logic to reason about strand spaces and show how to use this logic to specify security properties (section 3), and explain the automatic evaluation procedure (section 4). Next, we discuss the advantages of our approach and compare it with other approaches (section 5). Finally, we conclude in section 6. Proof sketches of most propositions in this paper are omitted and can be found in [23] .
Background
This section is a review of concepts developed by Thayer, Herzog and Guttman [25] . First, we explain the notion of terms that are used to represent the messages in the protocols. Then, we explain the notion of strands, strand spaces and bundles, and show how to represent protocols using strands. Finally, we give the formal description of the penetrator model.
Message Terms
The set of atomic terms is the union of a set of "Text" terms T and a set of "Key" terms K, where Text terms T contain several different types of terms, such as Principal-names, Nonces, or Bank-accountnumber.
Key terms K contains a set of keys disjoint from T. In asymmetric crypto systems, K ,1 represents K's opposite member in a public-private key pair. In a symmetric key system, K ,1 = K. The set of terms A is defined inductively as follows:
If m is a Text term or a Key term, then m is a term.
If m is a term, k is a Key term, then fmg k is a term. Thayer, Herzog and Guttman defined the subterm relation v: a term a 1 is a subterm of term a 2 if a 1 appears in a 2 ;
We define the interm relation b, such that a 1 is a interm of a 2 if a 1 can be extracted from a 2 without the application of the decryption operation. The formal definition of the two relations are as follows.
SSM : Strands, Strand spaces and Bundles
The notions in this subsection are mainly from the paper [25] . We extend them slightly to make them applicable to electronic commerce protocols.
Actions. The set of actions Act that principals can take during an execution of a protocol include extermal actions such as send and receive, and user-defined internal actions such as debit, credit, etc.. In the rest of the paper, we will only use send and receive for simplicity.
Events. An event is a pair haction, argui, where action is in Act, and argu is in A and is the argument of the action. For simplicity, we denote hsend, ai and hreceive, ai respectively as signed terms h+ai andh,ai. We represent the set of finite sequences of signed terms as A .
Strands and Strand Spaces.
A protocol defines the sequence of events for each role of the participant. A strand represents a sequence of actions of an instance of a role.
A strand space is a set with a trace mapping tr: ! A .
1.
A node is a pair hs; ii, with s 2 and i an integer satisfying 1 i length(tr(s)). We say n = hs; ii belongs to the strand s, denoted as n 2 s. Clearly, every node belongs to a unique strand. The set of nodes is denoted by N.
2. If n = hs; ii 2 N, then indexn = i and strandn = s. If trs i = h ai, where is one of the symbols +; ,, then termn = a.
3. If n 1 ; n 2 2 N, then n 1 ! n 2 means that termn 1 = +a and termn 2 = ,a. This represents that n 1 sends a message a and n 2 receives the message.
4. If n 1 ; n 2 2 N, then n 1 n 2 means that n 1 ; n 2 occur in the same strand with indexn 2 = indexn 1 + 1 . This represents an event n 1 followed immediately by n 2 in the same strand.
5. A term t originates from a node n 2 N iff sign(n) = + ; t v term(n); and whenever n 0 precedes n on the same strand, t 6 v term(n 0 ).
A term t uniquely-originates from node n iff t origi-
nates on a unique n 2 N. Nonces and other freshly generated terms are usually uniquely-originated.
We will also use N to refer to the directed graph N;E whose vertices are nodes and E = ! is the set of edges that combines both types of relations n 1 ! n 2 and n 1 n 2 .
Bundles.
A bundle represents the protocol execution under some configuration.
A bundle C = N C ; E is a subgraph of N, where E ! is the set of the edges and N C N is the set of nodes incident with the edges in E, and the following properties hold:
C is non-empty and finite;
If n 1 2 C and signn 1 = ,, then there is a unique n 2 such that n 2 ! n 1 2 C;
If n 1 2 C and n 2 n 1 , then n 2 n 1 2 C; C is acyclic.
We say a strand s 2 C if for every node n 2 s, n 2 C.
Causal Precedence. Let S be a strand space, nodes n 1 ,n 2 2 S. Define n 1 S n 2 iff there is a sequence of zero or more edges of type ! and leading from n 1 to n 2 in S. The proof of this lemma can be found in [25] .
Protocol specification using strands
A protocol usually contains several roles, such as initiators, responders and servers. The sequence of actions of each role is predefined by the protocol with a list of parameters, such as principal names and nonces. This can be specified as a trace type, denoted as role [parameter list] . A binding of the role and the parameter list gives an instancetrace of the role. A legal execution of a protocol forms a bundle, in which the strands of the legitimate principals are restricted to the predefined trace types, role[parameter list]. The strands of the legitimate principals are referred to as regular strands. The bundle also contains strands which are mapped to penetrator traces. These strands are referred to as penetrator strands. We explain them in more details in the next subsection. We now give an example of the NeedhamSchroeder protocol [18] with the fix given by Gavin Lowe in [12] . We will refer to this protocol as NSL in the rest of the paper. Using the standard notation, the protocol is defined as follows: 
The Penetrator Model
We use the same penetrator model as the one in [25] . The penetrator P has a set of initial knowledge init-info(P) which usually contains the principal names and the keys that are known initially to the penetrator, denoted as K p . K p usually contains all the public keys, all the private keys of the penetrator, and all the symmetric keys K px , K xp initially shared between the penetrator and principals playing by the protocol rules. It can also contain some keys to model known-key attacks.
A penetrator can intercept messages, generate messages that are computable from its initial knowledge and the messages it intercepts. These actions are modeled by a set of penetrator strands.
A penetrator strand is one of the following, where g and h are terms: 
The different types of the penetrator traces are called penetrator roles, which ranges over fM,F,T,C,S,K,E,Dg.
It is also possible to extend the set of penetrator traces to model some special ability of the penetrator if needed.
The Logic
We first introduce a logic to reason about strand spaces and bundles. Then we show how to use this logic for formal specification of various security properties.
Syntax
The syntax of the terms consists of node constants (n; n 1 ; : : : ), strand constants (s; s 1 ; : : : ), bundle constant (c; c 1 ; : : : ), and bundle variable (C;C 1 ; : : : ).
Propositional formulas are defined as follows: n 2 s, n 2 c, n 2 C, s 2 c, s 2 C are (atomic) propositional formulas;
: f 1 and f 1^f2 are propositional formulas if f 1 and f 2 are propositional formulas.
Finally, well-formed formulas (wffs) are: f, :F 1 , F 1^F2 ; 8 C:f, where f is a propositional formula, which doesn't contain any other free variable than C; where f is a propositional formula, F 1 and F 2 are wffs, and C is a bundle variable.
Notice, that in a wff 8C:f, f needs to be a propositional formula and cannot contain any other variables than C. We also use the obvious abbreviations:
Semantics
Let the set of nodes be N. For a given protocol, the set of the regular strands and the penetrator strands is S p ; the execution traces of a protocol p form a set of bundles, denoted as D p . Thus, for a given protocol p, the model M is a pair (fN , S p , D p g, I), where I is the interpretation. The semantics of the logic is given as follows : I n; Is; Ic are a node, a strand and a bundle in N; S p ; D p respectively. M j = n 2 s iff In 2 I s. We can similarly define M j = n 2 c; M j = s 2 c as well.
If f is a propositional formula or a wff, then M j = :f iff M 6 j = f. 
Specifying security properties in the logic
Our logic can specify a variety of security properties including electronic commerce properties. However, here we mainly focus on the authentication and secrecy properties. The properties are presented in a similar way as in the paper [25] except that we formalize the properties into the wffs in our logic.
Authentication
Gavin Lowe [13] proposed agreement properties for authentication protocols. A protocol guarantees a participant B (say, as the responder) agreement for certain bindingx if each time a principal B completes a run of the protocol as a responder usingx, supposedly with A, then there is a unique run of the protocol with the principal A as initiator usingx, supposedly with B.
A weaker non-injective agreement does not ensure uniqueness, but requires only each time a principal B completes a run of the protocol as responder usingx, supposedly with A, then there exists a run of the protocol with the principal A as initiator usingx, supposedly with B.
The non-injective agreement property can be specified using the logic as: Because of the freshness of the nonces generated in the protocol run, usually the agreement property can be proved after the non-injective agreement property is proved, with the argument that there can't be two strands Initx 2 C since the nonces in Initx are uniquely originated from only one strand, i.e. in NSL protocol, N a is uniquely-originated in the strand Init A; B; N a ; N b .
Secrecy
A value v is secret in a strand space S if, for every bundle C that contains S, there does not exist a node n 2 C such that termn = v. For example, when S is a responder strand, we can specify the secrecy property as :
:9C:Respx 2 C^node+v 2 C
The Model Checking Algorithm
This section introduces a model checking algorithm for wffs. We focus on the most interesting case: how to evaluate a wff of the form 8C:f. The proof sketch of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Hence, it is sufficient to just explain the procedure H. where s 1 is a strand constant, s 2 is a regular strand constant.
These cases can be used for evaluating agreement properties and secrecy properties as mentioned in section 3. The other cases are simple extensions from them.
In the following subsections, we first introduce the notions and state structures used in the model checking algorithm. We then explain formally how we can reduce a problem in an infinite space to a problem of model checking which is restricted to a finite state space. We then describe in more details the model checking algorithm, in particular the next state transition function. We will also point out various techniques we exploit for state space reduction. Finally, we explain how we can use unreachability theorems to further reduce state space explored.
Goals and Goal-bindings
Intuition: We start with a strand space graph which only contains s 1 , and then try all possibilities of adding nodes and strands to complete a bundle (an exhaustive search). To complete a bundle, the graph needs to be backward closed under and !, and acyclic. To make the graph backward closed under !, it means that any term that is received by a node must have been sent by another node in the same graph. Thus, we introduce a notion of a goal to represent the received terms, and a notion of a goal-binding to represent that a goal term is first sent by a node. We apply unification to search for all possible goal-bindings. When all goals are bound, all received terms are connected to their first senders. Hence, the graph will be backward closed under !. For any node in the graph, we add all the nodes, that precede it in the same strand, to the graph. Thus, the graph is backward closed under . Simple cycle-detection can check whether a graph is acyclic.
Goals.
A goal is a pair t; n, where signn = ,, t b
Termn and t is not a concatenation of other two terms. The goal-set of a bundle C is the set of all the goals in C, denoted as GC.
Goal Binding. Suppose that C is a bundle, then a goal t; n is bound to node n 0 if n 0 is a C -minimal member of the set = fm 2 C j t b termm, signm = + , and m ng:
We say that t; n; n 0 is the goal binding for t; n and denote it as n 0 t n. The node n 0 is called a binder of (t,n). We will also write n 0 n to denote n 0 t n for some t, or, formally, = S Proof sketch. Since sign(n) = ,, and n 2 C, there must exist a node n 00 , where n 00 = h,Termni and n 00 2 C. So t b Termn 00 . Therefore, the set is not empty, where = fm 2 C j t b Termm and signm = + and m ng:
As shown in Lemma 2.1, has at least a C -minimal member n 0 . Hence, t; n can be bound to n 0 .
A bundle contains the information about the sequence of actions of each principal ("") and the information about who sends messages to whom ("!"). Because the penetrator can always intercept a message from a principal and forward it to another principal, the information about who sends messages to whom ("!") is not important any more. Given a received term, it is not important who sends it but rather who sends it first. Therefore, only the goal-binding information ("") is necessary. This is the intuition why we introduce the relation "". In the state structure, we do not keep the information about the relation "!" but only the goal-binding relation "".
State Structures
Semi-bundles. A semi-bundle h = N h ; E is a subgraph of N, where E is the set of edges, N h is the set of nodes incident to the edges in E , and the following properties hold: N h is non-empty and finite; If n 1 2 N h and n 2 n 1 , then n 2 n 1 2 E ; h is acyclic.
Notice that the notion of a semi-bundle differs from the notion of a bundle in the aspect that a semi-bundle is backward closed under , and not necessarily backward closed under !.
States. A state is a tuple hS; G; ;-i,where S is a semi-bundle containing strands of the principals; G is the set of unbound goals of S; is the relation for the goal-bindings; -= -a reflexive and transitive closure of and together. In other words, n 1 -n 2 iff there exists a sequence of nodes fn 0 i g k i=1 , such that n 1 = n 0 1 , n 2 = n 0 k , and for any i 2 1; k , 1 , n 0 i n 0 i+1 or n 0 i n 0 i+1 . Hence, the relation -is a partial order on the nodes in S. Mathematically, G and -can be computed from S and , but we keep them in the state structure for efficiency reasons.
If l = hS l ; G l ; l ; -l i is a state and c is a bundle, we say l 2 c iff S l 2 c.
Proposition 4.3. If G is empty in a state hS; G; ;-i,then
there exists a bundle C such that S 2 C, and S and C contain the same strands except that C might contain some more penetrator strands of type R or T than S.
The Model Checking Algorithm
Bundle Sets. We define the bundle set of a state l to be the set of bundles that contain l, denoted as l = fc : bundle j l 2 cg. 9C:s 1 2 C , 9 c:c 2 l 0 :
The main procedure is a reachability analysis with a given next state transition F. We will explain the next state transition F in the next subsection. searchI is the procedure for evaluating the formula 1 , and searchII for 2 . We give the pseudo code for searchI as follows. searchII is similar to searchI, and the pseudo code can be found in [23] . g choose(L) is a function which returns an element in the set L. We always pick a state which contains the least number of strands in the set L first.
We now give some intuition how we can reduce an infinite-state-space problem to a problem in a finite state space. First, from the Equation 4.1, we transform 1 into the equivalent formula,8c 2 l 0 :s 2 
The next state transition algorithms
We first give the intuition of the next state function F. Because we only add (and never delete) nodes and strands in the next state transition, and since the next state transition covers all possibilities of binding a goal, we can see that F is complete-inclusive. The proof sketch can be found in [23] .
Notice that due to the most general substitution in a goal-binding, the nodes and strands in a state can contain free variables. A semi-bundle Sx in a state s with free variables,x, represents a set of variable-free semi-bundles, f ~ =x sxg, where~ is a substitution of values. Thus, the state sx represents a set of variable-free states. Hence, we can represent states and state transitions much more efficiently Also, notice that we only add nodes and strands when necessary due to the exact causal relation, which reduces the state space even further.
Unreachability Analysis
In order to reduce the search space even further, we can use unreachability theorems to prove early that a state is unreachable. Recall that a state is unreachable if there is no bundle containing it. For practical purposes, we need to be able to express such theorems as computable predicates , that is, if s is true, then the state s is unreachable. Thus, we can simply eliminate s from the set of states immediately.
The unreachability theorems can be specific to a particular protocol, or can be general theorems that are not restricted to any concrete example. The latter can be proven once and for all and included in the core of the tool. This let the model checker easily incorporate results from theorem proving techniques and greatly reduce the state space explored. We give two examples of the unreachability theorems as follows. The proof of this proposition is in [25] . If a protocol is well-typed, in other words, all messages specified in a protocol have fixed types, we can always compute a number which is the maximum number of nested encryption operations in a message that can be generated by a legitimate principal, denoted as E m . Then the following proposition holds. 
Discussion
Our approach has a number of advantages over previous techniques for automatic analysis of security protocols.
First, unlike most model checkers, our approach can reason about problems of infinite state space. When the evaluation procedure terminates, it will have found a mapping from the infinite state space to a finite state space while preserving the validity of well-formed formulae. The mapping is from the set of bundles to the non-empty leaf states of the search tree as described in section 4.3. Thus, by analyzing the finite state space, Athena can derive a proof that a security property holds under any configuration of the protocol execution.
Second, the state transition in Athena is not asynchronously composed of independent process transitions, but based on goal-bindings. Therefore, we avoid the state space explosion caused by asynchronous composition, while others suffer severely from this problem. Most other approaches are based on a trace-based model, where the global state is a list of independent local processes of the principals, and the global state transition is the asynchronous composition of the local process transitions. Hence, concurrent events are modeled by allowing all possible interleaving, and the state space grows exponentially with the number of principals in the protocol execution [20, 21] . In practice, these approaches have difficulties handling protocol executions with more than two initiators and responders. Although some researchers have explored observations that reduce the number of states and paths to be checked [22] , and others are pursuing partial order reduction techniques, these techniques will still require a large number of states and paths to be checked unnecessarily.
Third is still difficult to do aggressive symmetry reduction. Fifth, Athena uses backward search instead of forward search. With forward search, all the participating principals have to be pre-stated. Our approach starts with a simple initial strand and then add new strands only when necessary according to the exact causal relation. Hence, we reduce the state space explored by avoiding the exploration of many unnecessary states and paths.
Sixth, our approach can use unreachability theorems to prove early that a state is unreachable, hence, prune the state space. The unreachability theorems can be specific to a particular protocol, or can be general theorems that are not restricted to any concrete example. The latter can be proven once and for all and included in the core of the tool. This let the model checker incorporate results from theorem proving techniques easily and systematically.
Our experimental results demonstrate the advantages of using Athena. For the NSL protocol, Athena explored 19 states and proved the agreement property of the protocol under any configuration. The sketch of the analysis can be found in the appendix. As shown in table 1, the number of states explored by Mur' and Brutus grows rapidly as the number of initiators and responders increase. For example, with two initiators and responders, Mur' and Brutus explore over 10,000 times as many states as Athena. We have also used Athena to find the known attacks in the NeedhamSchroeder protocol [18] and the TMN protocol [24] . We have also used Athena to prove certain properties of the 1KP protocol [1] and the Kerberos protocol [10, 11] . Detailed results about these experiments can be found in [23] .
Conclusions
We propose an efficient automatic checking algorithm, Athena, for analyzing security protocols. Athena incorporates a logic that can express security properties including authentication, secrecy and properties related to elec-tronic commerce. We have developed an automatic procedure for evaluating well-formed formulae in this logic. For a well-formed formula, if the evaluation procedure terminates, it will generate a counterexample if the formula is false, or provide a proof if the formula is true. Athena also exploits several state space reduction techniques. It naturally avoids the state space explosion problem commonly caused by asynchronous composition and symmetry redundancy. It also has the advantage that it can easily incorporate results from theorem proving through unreachability theorems to further reduce the state space explored and increase the likely-hood of termination. As shown in our experiments, we successfully rediscover known flaws or provide proofs of properties for protocols with exploring only tens of states. For each i 2 1; : : :; n , f i can be written as _ k k _ _ l : l , where k and l are atomic propositions. This is equivalent to ^l l _ k k . So f i can be evaluated in finite steps by H. Hence, it is easy to see that we can decide F in finite steps.
